Game-theoretic modeling of collective decision-making during epidemics

We introduce a parsimonious game-theoretic behavioral--epidemic model, in which an interplay of realistic factors shapes the co-evolution of individual decision-making and epidemics on a network. Although such a co-evolution is deeply intertwined in the real-world, existing models schematize population behavior as instantaneously reactive, thus being unable to capture human behavior in the long term. Our model offers a unified framework to model and predict complex emergent phenomena, including successful collective responses, periodic oscillations, and resurgent epidemic outbreaks, as illustrated through two real-world case studies..

Medienart:

Preprint

Erscheinungsjahr:

2020

Erschienen:

2020

Enthalten in:

arXiv.org - (2020) vom: 05. Aug. Zur Gesamtaufnahme - year:2020

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Ye, Mengbin [VerfasserIn]
Zino, Lorenzo [VerfasserIn]
Rizzo, Alessandro [VerfasserIn]
Cao, Ming [VerfasserIn]

Links:

Volltext [kostenfrei]

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

XAR018509045