Research on the game of manufacturing capacity sharing based on prospect theory
© 2023. Springer Nature Limited..
In order to investigate the strategy choice of each player in capacity sharing, the article constructs a tripartite game model based on capacity provider-capacity demander-government, introduces the prospect theory and conducts numerical simulation analysis using MATLAB. The results show that capacity sharing in the manufacturing industry is related to three parties: capacity providers, capacity demanders and the government, and their strategies in the game process influence each other; the sensitivity of capacity providers and capacity demanders is higher than that of the government; the increase of risk-return coefficient and loss-avoidance coefficient is conducive to the evolution of subjects to the ideal state.
| Medienart: |
E-Artikel |
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| Erscheinungsjahr: |
2023 |
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| Erschienen: |
2023 |
| Enthalten in: |
Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:13 |
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| Enthalten in: |
Scientific reports - 13(2023), 1 vom: 23. Okt., Seite 18093 |
| Sprache: |
Englisch |
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| Beteiligte Personen: |
Wang, Tian-Yu [VerfasserIn] |
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| Anmerkungen: |
Date Revised 22.11.2023 published: Electronic Citation Status PubMed-not-MEDLINE |
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| doi: |
10.1038/s41598-023-45189-x |
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| 520 | |a In order to investigate the strategy choice of each player in capacity sharing, the article constructs a tripartite game model based on capacity provider-capacity demander-government, introduces the prospect theory and conducts numerical simulation analysis using MATLAB. The results show that capacity sharing in the manufacturing industry is related to three parties: capacity providers, capacity demanders and the government, and their strategies in the game process influence each other; the sensitivity of capacity providers and capacity demanders is higher than that of the government; the increase of risk-return coefficient and loss-avoidance coefficient is conducive to the evolution of subjects to the ideal state | ||
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