Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Copyright: © 2023 Huang et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited..

With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases.

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2023

Erschienen:

2023

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:18

Enthalten in:

PloS one - 18(2023), 7 vom: 01., Seite e0287982

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Huang, Fuyou [VerfasserIn]
Liu, Bin [VerfasserIn]
Tao, Baoquan [VerfasserIn]
Deng, Yuankang [VerfasserIn]
Ma, Chao [VerfasserIn]

Links:

Volltext

Themen:

7440-44-0
Carbon
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

Anmerkungen:

Date Completed 21.07.2023

Date Revised 21.07.2023

published: Electronic-eCollection

Citation Status MEDLINE

doi:

10.1371/journal.pone.0287982

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

NLM35967674X