Differential game model and coordination model for green supply chain based on green technology research and development

© 2021 The Author(s)..

The purpose of this paper is to establish a green supply chain differential game model for green technology research and development based on a secondary green supply chain composed of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. It compares the differential game equilibrium solutions under centralized and decentralized decision-making. The green supply chain members are coordinated through the dynamic wholesale price mechanism, and numerical simulation is used as a methodology, to verify and explain the results. The study found that compared to decentralized decision-making, the level of green technology and the total profit of green channels are higher under centralized decision-making. When the coordination parameters are within a certain range, the dynamic wholesale price mechanism can coordinate the behavior of manufacturers and retailers. The result also discovers that under the dynamic wholesale price mechanism, with the increase of investment cost coefficient, or the increase of price sensitivity or the decrease of consumer's environmental awareness, the green technology level, product green degree, price, retailer's profit, and the total profit of green channel is decreased. In contrast, the wholesale price and manufacturer's profits are increased.

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2021

Erschienen:

2021

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:7

Enthalten in:

Heliyon - 7(2021), 8 vom: 25. Aug., Seite e07811

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Mohsin, A K M [VerfasserIn]
Far Abid Hossain, Syed [VerfasserIn]
Tushar, Hasanuzzaman [VerfasserIn]
Iqbal, Mohammed Masum [VerfasserIn]
Hossain, Alamgir [VerfasserIn]

Links:

Volltext

Themen:

Differential game
Dynamic wholesale price
Green supply chain
Green technology research
Journal Article

Anmerkungen:

Date Revised 03.09.2021

published: Electronic-eCollection

Citation Status PubMed-not-MEDLINE

doi:

10.1016/j.heliyon.2021.e07811

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

NLM330093525