Study on Benefit Coordination of Supply Chain Network Based on Green Development

Based on Stackelberg's master-slave game theory and green index decision-making conditions, this paper studies the benefit coordination of a supply chain network composed of a business flow network and logistics network, discusses the decision-making behavior of the main body of the supply chain network under the performance of green contracts or speculative behavior, respectively, and further constructs the supply chain network collaborative benefit coordination model under the guidance of a manufacturer considering a green development index. The supply chain network interest coordination model analyzes the relationship between the dominant manufacturer behavior and the supply chain network green index and network profit. The results show that fulfilling green contracts helps improve the profitability and sustainability of supply chain networks. A counter-intuitive but interesting result is that the dominant manufacturers increase the cost-sharing ratio or penalties of the logistics network, which will reduce the profit level and green index of the logistics network, and increase the cost-sharing ratio or punishment of the suppliers. Strength will increase the profitability and green index of the logistics network. Finally, we validate the relevant conclusions of the model through numerical simulation analysis.

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2019

Erschienen:

2019

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:16

Enthalten in:

International journal of environmental research and public health - 16(2019), 8 vom: 24. Apr.

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Gao, Xiong [VerfasserIn]
Wang, Yuhong [VerfasserIn]

Links:

Volltext

Themen:

Green index
Journal Article
Leading manufacturer
Network profit
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Supply chain network
Sustainability

Anmerkungen:

Date Completed 23.08.2019

Date Revised 25.02.2020

published: Electronic

Citation Status MEDLINE

doi:

10.3390/ijerph16081458

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

NLM296430021