The relative power of individual distancing efforts and public policies to curb the COVID-19 epidemics.

Lockdown curbs the COVID-19 epidemics but at huge costs. Public debates question its impact compared to reliance on individual responsibility. We study how rationally chosen self-protective behavior impacts the spread of the epidemics and interacts with policies. We first assess the value of lockdown in terms of mortality compared to a counterfactual scenario that incorporates self-protection efforts; and second, assess how individual behavior modify the epidemic dynamics when public regulations change. We couple an SLIAR model, that includes asymptomatic transmission, with utility maximization: Individuals trade off economic and wellbeing costs from physical distancing with a lower infection risk. Physical distancing effort depends on risk aversion, perceptions of the epidemics and average distancing effort in the population. Rational distancing effort is computed as a Nash Equilibrium. Equilibrium effort differs markedly from constant, stochastic or proportional contacts reduction. It adjusts to daily incidence of hospitalization in a way that creates a slightly decreasing plateau in epidemic prevalence. Calibration on French data shows that a business-as-usual benchmark yields an overestimation of the number of deaths by a factor of 10 compared to benchmarks with equilibrium efforts. However, lockdown saves nearly twice as many lives as individual efforts alone. Public policies post-lockdown have a limited impact as they partly crowd out individual efforts. Communication that increases risk salience is more effective..

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2021

Erschienen:

2021

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:16

Enthalten in:

PLoS ONE - 16(2021), 5, p e0250764

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Cécile Aubert [VerfasserIn]
Emmanuelle Augeraud-Véron [VerfasserIn]

Links:

doi.org [kostenfrei]
doaj.org [kostenfrei]
doi.org [kostenfrei]
Journal toc [kostenfrei]

Themen:

Medicine
Q
R
Science

doi:

10.1371/journal.pone.0250764

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

DOAJ005194393