What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell's concept of distress

© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd..

Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person's severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell's theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell's account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, 'distress' just means 'suffering' or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell's theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell's theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2020

Erschienen:

2020

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:34

Enthalten in:

Bioethics - 34(2020), 7 vom: 26. Sept., Seite 695-702

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Duffee, Charlotte [VerfasserIn]
Cassell, Eric [Sonstige Person]

Links:

Volltext

Themen:

Biography
Distress
End-of-life
Historical Article
Journal Article
Pain
Person
Suffering

Anmerkungen:

Date Completed 30.07.2021

Date Revised 30.07.2021

published: Print-Electronic

Citation Status MEDLINE

doi:

10.1111/bioe.12748

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

NLM312055579