What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell's concept of distress
© 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd..
Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person's severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell's theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell's account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, 'distress' just means 'suffering' or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell's theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell's theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.
Medienart: |
E-Artikel |
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Erscheinungsjahr: |
2020 |
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Erschienen: |
2020 |
Enthalten in: |
Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:34 |
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Enthalten in: |
Bioethics - 34(2020), 7 vom: 26. Sept., Seite 695-702 |
Sprache: |
Englisch |
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Beteiligte Personen: |
Duffee, Charlotte [VerfasserIn] |
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Themen: |
Biography |
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Date Completed 30.07.2021 Date Revised 30.07.2021 published: Print-Electronic Citation Status MEDLINE |
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doi: |
10.1111/bioe.12748 |
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520 | |a Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person's severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell's theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell's account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, 'distress' just means 'suffering' or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell's theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell's theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is | ||
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