The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery

Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved..

Public goods dilemmas are at the heart of some of the greatest challenges of our time, including climate inaction, growing inequality, and the overuse of natural resources. The public goods game in which cooperators contribute to a common pool that is then shared equally with defectors who contribute nothing captures the gist of the problem. Cooperators therefore cannot prevail, which ultimately leads to the tragedy of the commons. Actions such as punishment, rewards, and exclusion have been shown to help, but they are costly, therefore rendering cooperators second-order free-riders due to their lack of participation in these actions. In the search for a remedy, we study the public goods game with benevolent leaders who, at a personal cost, have the ability to exclude defectors from using common pool resources. We also consider bribers who can pay the leaders to relax their exclusion efforts. In a traditional setting, this setup yields the standard second-order free-rider problem, where, ironically, the leaders are overcome by cooperators, who then themselves succumb to defectors. We show, however, that the Singaporean model - where a leader's payoff is determined not only by the regular sharing income from the firm production but also by the success of gross firm production as an incentive - can resolve the second-order free-rider problem. We also show that the detrimental effect of bribery can always be, no matter how high the bribe, held in check as long as the number of individuals engaged in this activity is low compared to the number of benevolent leaders. Otherwise, an abrupt transition to a cooperator-less state becomes unavoidable. We discuss the implications of our research for designing successful cooperation and anti-corruption strategies in public goods dilemmas.

Medienart:

E-Artikel

Erscheinungsjahr:

2020

Erschienen:

2020

Enthalten in:

Zur Gesamtaufnahme - volume:501

Enthalten in:

Journal of theoretical biology - 501(2020) vom: 21. Sept., Seite 110345

Sprache:

Englisch

Beteiligte Personen:

Fang, Yinhai [VerfasserIn]
Perc, Matjaž [VerfasserIn]
Xu, Haiyan [VerfasserIn]

Links:

Volltext

Themen:

Bribery
Cooperation
Evolutionary game theory
Journal Article
Public goods
Punishment
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't

Anmerkungen:

Date Completed 21.06.2021

Date Revised 21.06.2021

published: Print-Electronic

Citation Status MEDLINE

doi:

10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110345

funding:

Förderinstitution / Projekttitel:

PPN (Katalog-ID):

NLM310322448